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Privatization in Africa: What has happened? What is to be done?  
 
Summary 
Sub-Saharan African states urgently need expanded and more dynamic private sectors, 
more efficient and effective infrastructure/utility provision, and increased investment 
from both domestic and foreign sources.  Privatization is one way to address these 
problems.  But African states have generally been slow and reluctant privatizers; a good 
percentage of industrial/manufacturing and most infrastructure still remains in state 
hands. Given prevailing public hostility towards privatization, and widespread 
institutional weaknesses, such caution is defensible, but nonetheless very costly.  The 
long-run and difficult solution is the creation and reinforcement of the institutions that 
underpin and guide proper market operations.  In the interim, African governments and 
donors have little choice but to continue to experiment with the use of externally 
supplied substitutes for gaps in local regulatory and legal systems.   
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I.   Introduction 
 
Consider the case of Guinea, one of the poorest countries in Africa, and thus, one 
of the poorest countries in the world.   
 
From independence in 1960 through the end of the 1980s, Guinea’s state-owned 
and operated infrastructure companies (SOEs) in telecommunications, energy and water 
provided consumers with an inadequate quantity of low quality services.  As of 1989, 
only 38% of Guineans had access to piped water, almost none in rural areas.  Those 
connected suffered frequent interruption of service.  Water quality was poor and 
unhealthy; “…waterborne diseases were the main cause of death for infants and there 
were periodic cholera epidemics.”(Ménard and Clarke, 2002, a, 277)  One plus: the price 
for the few connected customers was low:  US$0.02 per cubic meter— m
3  —until 1986, 
and $0.12 per m
3 thereafter. But half or more of the water sent into the system vanished 
and was never billed.  At this price, with this rate of loss, the national water company 
could not come near covering its operating costs, much less invest in badly needed 
maintenance and expansion.  Donors made repeated attempts to work with government to 
reform the national water company; these failed to make a major or sustained difference.  
 
In 1989, Guinea entered into a lease arrangement with a private provider to 
deliver water in the capital, Conakry, and 16 other towns.  Under this scheme, 
Government retained ownership of the assets, responsibility for setting policy and tariffs, 
and (with World Bank assistance) marshalling investment finance and expanding the 
network.  A private firm was selected to operate and maintain existing facilities, and bill 
and collect payments from customers.  By agreement, the price per m
3 of water at once 
more than doubled. This was still inadequate to cover operating costs, so a World Bank 
credit covered the difference between revenues and costs in the early years.  This subsidy 







Over the next seven years, major improvements took place.  Connections 
increased from 12,000 to 23,000.  The percentage of metered private customers rose from 
5 to 93%, and to 100% for government customers.  The percentage of the population with 
access to water rose from 38 to 47% (Brook Cowen, 1999, 1) and the pace of increase 
was greater than it had been under public ownership. Very importantly, water quality 
improved greatly.
1 Tariffs rose to levels covering variable costs, revenues of the water 
company rose by a factor of ten, and the World Bank subsidy ended. Sixty-four percent 
of customers billed paid their fees, (Shirley, 2002, 22) a modest rate compared to 
international norms, but much improved over past collection achievements. Compared to 
failed earlier attempts to reform the system without the involvement of the private sector, 
all this was impressive.  But a number of major concerns remained. 
 
First, by 1997 the price per m
3 stood at US$ 0.83, a near seven-fold increase from 
1989, and more than 40 times the 1986 price. The price was very high in comparison to 
most OECD countries, much less African neighbors
2, and was considerably higher than 
in most other lease/concession arrangements in Asia and Latin America (where smaller 
increases had often provoked street protests).  A cross subsidy scheme allowed small 
volume users to pay less than large, but both the reduction in price per m
3 and the 
monthly amount to which the lower price applied were smaller than in most other 
countries. (Shirley, 2002, 15)  Post-privatization, an essential commodity had become 
less affordable.
3   
 
                                                 
1 Improving water quality can have a large social impact.  In Argentina, improvements in water quality in 
the 30% of municipalities with privatized provision led to declines in infant mortality, from water borne 
diseases alone, by 5 to 9%, versus areas where water continued to be supplied by publicly operated firms.  
The poorer the area, the greater the impact; poorest neighborhoods saw declines in infant mortality of up to 
24%.  See Galiani, Gertler and Schargrodsky (2002). 
2 In Abidjan in the neighboring Ivory Coast, the privatized water company offered an average price in 1997 
of US $0.54/ m
3 . 
3 Less affordable for some; the distributional impact of the price increase is unclear.  Most poor people in 
Guinea were not and still are not hooked up to the water network; those connected are probably from the 
middle and upper income strata.  A price rise for these consumers, even substantial, may have a limited 
direct effect on either inequality or poverty.  But it is also quite likely that increased prices in the formal 
water network have been passed on to many poor consumers, at least in urban areas—who often get their 







Second, while the physical network expanded, the rate of growth was less than 
anticipated.  Unlike more recent leases and concessions around the world, this contract 
did not place investment responsibility in private hands, and it did not specify expansion 
and connection targets for the SOE that retained responsibility for enlarging the network.  
Third, the amount of unaccounted water remained well above 40 %. Government 
costumers did pay for service a bit more regularly than before, but many government 
offices remained in arrears to the provider—and the private company did not cut service 
to any central government unit, even though this was expressly permitted in its contract. 
Had water losses and billing and collection been more aggressively addressed, revenues 
would have increased, and prices might have fallen——but under the lease agreement the 
private provider had no overwhelming incentive to push for such improvements.   
 
This was largely due to a fourth factor: The government was still very much 
involved in key parts of the water business, and its performance continued to be weak. 
The experienced private operator apparently had little difficulty persuading the 
inexperienced government regulators to accept price hikes. It may be that the private 
provider found it easier to negotiate tariff increases than to collect aggressively.
4  In any 
event, since all commercial risk was borne by the government, the private manager was 
free to select the path of least resistance, constrained only by the competence and 
dynamism of the government regulatory agency.  The question then becomes:  Did 
regulators
5 capture—for consumers—a reasonable share of the financial benefits arising 
from the efficiency gains produced post-lease?  The answer depends on the 
“counterfactual;” what would have happened had the contract not been let, had the public 
sector remained in control? As discussed below, careful students of the process conclude 
that private involvement produced superior results, despite the large price increases.  
 
                                                 
4 The private provider would argue, with justification, that the high price was legitimate given 
government’s inability to expand the network as expected, to permit service termination to customers in 
arrears—i.e., to hold up its side of the bargain—and the reluctance of local courts to allow the water firm to 
sanction customers who failed to pay. 
5 In Guinea, regulation of the contract was placed in the hands of the “rump” SOE that had formerly 






Thus, in sum, the lease produced gains, including gains to general consumers; but these 
were less than expected, and they came at a slow pace and quite a high cost. 
 
II.  African Privatization:  The record to date  
 
The Guinea water story reflects in miniature Africa’s struggle with privatization, 
particularly in infrastructure, where one finds the largest and most economically 
important SOEs.  The general story is this:  Poor service provision by loss-making public 
enterprises led first to reforms short of private sector involvement.  These produced no, 
modest, or unsustainable improvements. Financial losses mounted. They led to further 
deterioration in service quantity and quality, and increased burdens on the government 
budget.  IMF involvement and surveillance led to a choking off of direct budgetary 
financing of SOEs.  In most cases the banking system, initially state-owned or dominated, 
then took on the task of financing the enterprises. Debts were incurred but not serviced.  
The banks rapidly accumulated a non-performing portfolio and severe solvency 
problems. Financing/fiscal problems grew acute. These, and not efficiency concerns per 
se, became the principal driver of SOE reform.  Typically, it was the IMF that highlighted 
the issue and insisted upon efforts to resolve it.  In response, private sector management, 
financing or ownership was proposed. The World Bank then became more directly 
involved, in terms of reform/privatization design, and assistance in implementation.   
 
In many, probably most African countries, the principal motivation for 
privatization has been to placate the IFIs.  African governments do increasingly recognize 
the SOE problem; and numerous African leaders and observers preach the gospel of 
financial discipline and market-oriented reform.  Still, commitment to privatization as the 
best way to solve SOE problems has been neither widespread not strong.  Most African 
leaders and officials would prefer that the SOE problem be addressed by means other 
than ownership change.
6  A review of the scope and pace of African privatization 
supports this allegation.  
                                                 
6 Temu’s and Due’s (1998) description of Tanzanian reaction to the very idea of privatization applies in a 






   
On average, African states have privatized a smaller percentage—about 40 %—of 
their SOEs than other regions, far less than in Latin America or the transition economies.
7 
Much of the African divestiture that has taken place has been of smaller, less valuable, 
often moribund manufacturing, industrial and service concerns. In contrast, infrastructure 
privatization has lagged.  Of the roughly 2300 privatizations in sub-Saharan Africa in the 
decade 1991-2001,
8 only about 66 involved these generally higher value, economically 
more important firms.  An additional 92 transactions took place in transport, some of 
which might have been classed as infrastructure.  But even if one includes all the latter, 
less than 7 % of sales have touched the upper end infrastructure firms.   
Moreover, activity has been concentrated in a very few countries:  Of the $9 
billion USD of African privatization revenues raised from 1991 to 2001,
9 a full third was 
generated by a handful of privatizations in South Africa.  Another 33 % came from sales 
in a group of four actively privatizing countries (Ghana, Nigeria, Zambia and Ivory 
Coast).  Some 26 African countries, taken together, have privatized a scant $ 0.7 billion 
USD of assets (see Table 2).   
                                                                                                                                                 
learned.  The government feared losing its commanding heights; the people feared the loss of the 
enterprises their hard-earned taxes had supported.  Those fearful of private enterprise saw the new owners 
dismantling the parastatals and cashing in on the rewards.  Even supporters of privatization saw parastatal 
managers stripping the firms and cashing in whatever was saleable.” (333) 
7 And if one removes from the list of 29 countries (for which one can estimate the percentage of the SOE 
portfolio divested) the six leaders in terms of numbers of firms sold—Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Togo 
and Zambia—the fraction of SOE stock privatized falls to about ¼ .  Thirteen of these 29 countries have 
privatized less than 30 % of their SOE portfolios; only 6 have divested more than 75%. 
8 Note that most of the 2300 sales were completed by 1997; since then, in line with the worldwide decline 
in investor interest in emerging markets, the number of privatizations in Africa has fallen below 100 per 
year. 
9 In contrast, privatization revenues in Italy alone, in the period 1990-2001, totaled $112 bn USD, and even 
New Zealand—ranking 10
th  on an OECD list of privatizing states, and with a population of less than 4 
million—generated more from privatization in this period than did all 37 African countries. (Source: 
Mahboobi [2002], 46)  Moreover,  African privatization revenues may be significantly overestimated; in a 















 Angola  57 6 ...
 Benin  28 49 38%
 Burkina Faso  23 9 32%
 Burundi  38 4 ...
 Cameroon  48 244  28%
 Cape Verde  42 53 ...
 Central African Republic  18 ... 50%
 Chad  35 12 ...
 Congo (Brazzaville)  65 50 ...
 Congo (Kinshasa)  5 ... 4%
 Côte d’Ivoire  82 622 55%
 Etiopía  10 410 6%
 Gabon  1 ... 6%
 Gambia  17 2.4 85%
 Ghana  181 936.5 69%
 Guinea  31 45 27%
 Guinea Bissau  25 0.5 64%
 Kenya  189 381 79%
 Lesotho  10 6.5 20%
 Madagascar  61 16.9 33%
 Malawi  11 53.2 44%
 Mali  59 67.4 92%
 Mauritania  19 1.2 20%
 Mozambique  474 135 39%
 Níger  10 1.8 18%
 Nigeria  30 893.5 6%
 Rwanda  1 … 3%
 Sao Tome & Principe  4 0.4 ...
 Senegal  39 415 23%
 Sierra Leone  8 1.6 31%
 South Africa  8 3151 ...
 Sudan  32 ... ...
 Tanzania  199 287 53%
 Togo  49 38 89%
 Uganda  102 174 79%
 Zambia  253 828 90%
 Zimbabwe  6 217 10%




Sources: This and all other tables based on a compilation and updating of the data bases conducted by 
Thierry Buchs, IFC, 2002.  They are drawn from World Bank Africa Region Privatization Database, World Bank, 
2002; WDI database 1991-2000; IMF Staff Country Reports, 1998-2002; and Table 1, CAMPBELL WHITE & BHATIA 







Table 2: . Countries in which total transaction values exceeded 

























Finally, African states have retained significant minority equity stakes in the 
comparatively few infrastructure privatizations they have concluded, holding back from 
the market an average of 1/3 of shares.  (See Tables 3 and 4, below)   Governments claim 
that retained shares are weapons with which to protect the public interest against rascally 
or incompetent buyers.  Moreover, they often hope to sell the retained shares later at a 
much higher price, after the new private partner has driven up value.  Whether share 
retention actually achieves these goals is debatable.  What is not in doubt is that 
continued government involvement and share retention reduces the number of bidders 
and therefore the price per share sold.  The slow pace of sales, the reluctance to place the 
highest-potential assets on the market, the failure to sell all shares, poor business and 
legal environments, and the deficiencies of government regulation and administration—
—all combine to place African states in a dead heat with Middle Eastern and North 
African countries for the title of “region with the least foreign investment in 



























Services, Tourism & real estate
Agriculture, agroindustry & fisheries
manufacturing and industry
 
Table 4: Government’s share of equity before and after privatization 
Sector  Average Government’s share of equity   (%)
Manufacturing & Industry  Before privatization  79.7
 After  privatization  7.9
Agriculture, Agroindustry & Fisheries  Before privatization  79.5
  After privatization  1.6
Services, Tourism & Real estate  Before privatization  70.2
 After  privatization  14.3
Trade  Before privatization  95.3
  After privatization  3.3
Transport Before  privatization  97.6
 After  privatization  4.9
Financial  Before privatization  86.7
  After privatization  8.2
Energy Before  privatization  88.3
 After  privatization  46.5
Water   Before privatization  100
  After privatization  12.5
Electricity Before  privatization  100
 After  privatization  33
Telecoms  Before privatization  95.8
  After privatization  42.8
Other Before  privatization  63.3
   After privatization  10.2
Total average government’s share of equity before privatization  89.1
























Total in 2001= $56.8 bn
 
Source:  World Bank, Private Provision of Infrastructure Database, 2002. (The investment tabulated is that in network service 
industries only—but that is where the bulk of investment goes.  LAC refers to Latin America-Caribbean countries; ECA, East Europe-
Central Asia; EAP, East Asia-Pacific; SA, South Asia, MENA, Middle East-North Africa, and SSA, sub-Saharan Africa.) 
 
 
Caution is correct? 
Caution on ownership change could be the right policy for Africa.  Here’s the 
argument:  Privatization outcomes are heavily affected by the institutional setting in 
which divestiture takes place.  In their haste to correct the quality flaws and financial 
losses of SOEs, proponents of privatization pushed excessively for rapid ownership 
change while neglecting or insufficiently emphasizing the institutional foundations on 
which good privatization must be based. Experience such as Guinea’s shows that 
privatization is more likely to result in increased efficiency and improved equity 
outcomes if it is embedded in a set of conceptually appropriate, functioning legal and 
economic institutions that support and guide market operations.  These include: The 
definition and protection of property rights; contract enforcement and commercial dispute 
settlement through lawful, peaceful means, or, more broadly, court decisions that are 






bankruptcy/insolvency regimes; and a public administration that meets modicum 
standards of predictability, competence and probity and thus lowers transactions costs. If 
these institutions are not in place and working, privatization will produce sub-optimal, 
perhaps negative outcomes. 
 
This notion has risen rapidly to the status of conventional wisdom; indeed, it is 
getting difficult to find an analysis of privatization that does not attribute to institutional 
weaknesses any deviation from hoped-for results.  But the concept is disturbingly vague 
and difficult to make sense of operationally.  It is unclear as to precisely how these 
institutions come into being and attain a state of effectiveness.  Nor is it clear just which 
ones are crucial in what particular circumstances, or in what sequence they should be 
introduced.  And while most of these policies/institutions function under the control of 
the public sector, is it, again, not clear as to what governments, and those that assist them, 
can do to aid their emergence and enhance their capacity.   
 
What is known?  (a) There is a strong association between institutional density 
and capacity and positive results, in both efficiency and equity terms, of ownership 
change. (b) Low income countries in general, and African countries in particular, rank 
low in terms of institutional density and capacity; and (c) the creation and reinforcement 
of market-supporting institutions, while imperfectly understood, is certainly a slow 
process. Thus, if African governments are moving cautiously on privatization—
particularly infrastructure privatization—in order to buy time to establish the needed 
institutional and regulatory frameworks, this could be a logical and positive step. 
 
This is a large “if.”  To date, it would appear that few African states have used the 
time gained through slow privatization to attack effectively the problem of deficient 
institutions——or if they have, the results are not yet visible.  (On the contrary, as is 
shown below in the case of Zambia, delaying privatization has sometimes resulted in 
further financial and asset erosion.)  Admittedly, results would be hard to assess:   
Practitioners possess little in the way of operational guidelines concerning the minimal 







10  And the standards by which to measure institutional effectiveness 
are embryonic and general.  As Shirley (2003, 1) notes, “…over time the development 
paradigm has shifted from ‘get your prices right’ to ‘get your institutions right;’ the latter 
instruction has proved as useless as the former.”
11 
 
One reason for this is that inaction on SOE reform sometimes reflects not simply 
lack of expertise, resources or institutional capacity, but rather intent, spurred by political 
hostility to privatization. As noted (see above, footnote 6), African intellectuals and 
officials have long been educated to view the public sector as the promoter and defender 
of indigenous interests, and to believe that privatization will empower and enrich 
foreigners.  African trade unions and workers’ representatives are generally opposed to 
privatization, fearing it will result in the loss of jobs, or worsen terms of service.
12 Many 
African (and European, Asian and Latin American) politicians and public officials reap 
material and prestige benefits from SOEs, in the form of loans, gifts, transport, housing, 
board memberships, future jobs for themselves, present jobs for friends, relatives and 
supporters, procurement kick-backs, and much else.  Domestic private sectors often have 
cozy supply relationships with SOEs that could be threatened by the arrival of more 
aggressive, quality-conscious, cost-cutting private owners.   In short, there are many 
powerful groups in all African states that have material reasons to delay, dilute or 
                                                 
10 A step in this direction, for one important sector at least, is found in Newbery (2001):  He lists the policy, 
regulatory and institutional requisites for electricity privatization to be effective.  In their absence 
“…reform of the….state-owned ESI to improve autonomy, accountability, and financial viability, may be 
the only option.  The fact that such reforms have failed in the past does not make it wise to encourage 
irreversible reforms of unproven worth, and privatisation in unpropitious circumstances may be even more 
costly than the unsatisfactory status quo.” (pp. 43-4)  No African case is discussed in Newbery’s paper.  
See also Sachs, Zinnes and Eilat, who argue that in transition states, at least, ownership change must be 
accompanied by a threshold level of what they termed “agency-related” institutional reforms of the type 
listed above.  If this modicum level of contracting and incentive reforms is not present, then ownership 
change may produce no or even negative effects.  Conversely, institutional change by itself is also 
insufficient to generate economic performance improvements “unless enough change-of-title privatization 
has already occurred.” (p. 54) 
11 Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002) argue that “the quality of institutions ‘trumps’ everything else” 
in explaining economic development outcomes.  But they note that the argument is at such a high level of 
abstraction as to provide little or no guidance to policymakers.  
12 At time of writing, among many examples that could be given, COSATU—the trade union organization 
in South Africa—has recently held public demonstrations to protest all past and planned privatizations, and 
the Zambian trade union congress has held protest marches and called on government to rescind its 
decision to privatize the Zambian National Commercial Bank, and to halt preparations for privatization in 






sabotage SOE reform, privatization in particular.  Of course, they make their case not by 
complaining about potential harm to their material interests, but rather by pointing to 
perceived economic, financial and social shortcomings of privatization.  On what grounds 
do they make their case? 
 
III.  Post-privatization Performance 
 
Rigorous assessments of privatization are increasingly available in Latin 
American, transition, OECD and Asian countries.  Such studies are relatively rare in 
Africa
13—though, as shown below, the few that exist generally present a positive picture 
of privatization’s achievements, particularly in the manufacturing, industrial and service 
sectors. First, the critics’ indictment of privatization; this is necessarily somewhat 
anecdotal in nature. 
 
Con… 
To illustrate with a single important case, officials in Zambia are reportedly 
thinking of halting and perhaps reversing their privatization program——one of the most 
extensive in Africa in terms of number of transactions, proceeds generated, and 
percentage of SOE portfolio divested
14 (see Tables above), and a program that in 1998 
was hailed by the World Bank as “the most successful” in Africa. (Campbell-White and 
Bhatia, 1998, 111)  But four years later, many Zambians clearly perceive privatization as 
almost entirely negative, and they are putting pressure on government to rethink the 
policy.  Privatization is alleged to have: 
•  been imposed and micromanaged by the IFIs, without sufficient attention 
to requisite policy or regulatory frameworks,  and with minimal 
involvement of Zambian citizens, 
 
•  resulted in the closure of many firms previously run by Zambians (there is 
particular resentment that many that continued or reopened are in the 
hands of foreigners, particularly South Africans),  
                                                 
13 “Monitoring and evaluation have largely been ignored; hence the paucity of data on—and the difficulty 
of judging—the progress and impact of privatization to date.”  Campbell-White and Bhatia.  (1998, 125) 
14 Though in value terms, many of the firms sold (outside the copper sector) have been small; the big 






•  added greatly to unemployment—and thus poverty and inequality—at a 
time when job opportunities are declining drastically, 
 
•  increased the incidence of corruption (there is widespread suspicion that 




•  benefited the rich, the foreign, the agile and politically well-connected (see 
Craig, 2000) at the expense of the poor, the domestic, the honest and the 
unaffiliated—as illustrated by the allegation that new private owners 
extract subsidies and tax concessions from government. 
 
Zambians claim that the IFIs were originally uninterested in assisting them to deal 
with the negative social effects of privatization (severance packages, retraining schemes, 
monitoring contractual obligations of new owners), and that even now they only pay 
serious attention to such matters when they are expressly involved in a specific 
transaction; i.e., when the World Bank’s private sector affiliate, the IFC, is one of the 
investors/purchasers, or when an IMF condition mandates movement on the sale of a 
major firm. 
 
The sentiments of Zambian opinion-makers toward liberalization in general, and 
privatization in particular, are summarized in an editorial in The Post  (of Lusaka; 
11.28.02): 
 
The hardships Zambians are going through are primarily a consequence of ... 
neoliberalism and neoliberal globalization. ... While it cannot be denied that 
corruption, extravagance and lack of priorities have considerably aggravated the 
situation, we shouldn’t forget that these factors are a product of this whole system 
- they are inherent problems of these policies. These IMF and World Bank 
policies breed corruption, extravagance and lack of priorities in our leaders and 
indeed our people. ... And despite having liberalized its markets, as dictated by the 
IMF and the World Bank, Zambia has still not started benefiting from it. 
What our country needs now is to think through its strategies and that primarily 
involves freeing itself from the IMF and World Bank indirect rule and start to 
direct the affairs of this country in the best interests of our people, and not the 
major shareholders of these institutions. Why should we privatize Zambia 
National Commercial Bank, Zesco Limited (electricity) and Zamtel 
(telecommunications) simply because the IMF and the World Bank want us to do 






believe it is not in their best interest? ... The success of IMF and World Bank 
policies over any alternative model of social development is a matter of 
propaganda than fact. If humans prevail, alternative policies to the IMF and 
World Bank’s programs will be found and implemented. The main thing is to 
have a political leadership that has a clear understanding of today’s neoliberal 
world and can stand firm. 
 
This encapsulates the views, prevalent in Zambia and widespread in Africa as a 
whole, that privatization has been forced upon Zambia by the IFIs, not produced the 
economic benefits it was supposed to deliver—and indeed imposed substantial costs—
and increased the level of corruption. Are these allegations accurate? 
 
  Pro… 
 
In 2001, the Zambian Privatization Agency commissioned a study to assess the 
effects of privatization.  It found that 235 of the 254 firms privatized since 1991 
continued in operation at the time of the study; not a bad achievement given the very poor 
financial state of these enterprises prior to divestiture, and the dismal business 
environment prevailing in the country throughout the 1990s.  In terms of numbers of 
sales, 57 % of the buyers were Zambian citizens, and an additional 13 % were joint 
ventures between Zambians and foreigners; the remaining 30 % of sales were to 
foreigners (many of whom had been minority equity partners in SOEs and who held, and 
exercised, pre-emptive rights on the sales of shares).  However, by value, Zambians 
account for just 5 % of sales, joint ventures 83 % and totally foreign purchasers 12 %. A 
scheme to “warehouse” a minority stake of shares in privatized firms and float them later 
to Zambian buyers has had but minimal success.  Some of the most visible firms, such as 
the breweries, went to South African owners (who have turned them into profitable 
ventures).  
 
A prime rationale for privatization is the inability of government to access 
investment capital for renewal and expansion of SOEs:  In the non-mining firms 
reviewed, post-privatization capital expenditures totaled more than $400 million USD.  






lamented in Zambia—though a 7.5 % failure rate is less than small and medium business 
failure rates in most advanced industrial economies.  Seven of the 19 subsequently 
resumed operations after being re-sold, and similar efforts were underway in an 
additional five—leaving only seven firms definitively closed.
15   And a number of 
company closures sometimes cited as evidence of the failure of privatization were either 
firms that had always been private, or SOEs.   
 
In the privatized non-mining firms, employment declined from 28,000 at time of 
privatization
16 to 20,000 in 2001, a comparatively large percentage, but a small number in 
absolute terms.  Most of the decline took place immediately following divestiture and 
was concentrated in a few large firms in agro-industry.  Workforce expansions occurred 
in several firms.  
 
There is less clarity and far more controversy about the fate of the 34,000 workers 
employed in the privatized mining sector. A highly publicized and troubling issue for the 
privatization program is that two large mines—Luanshya and Baluba—were sold to a 
bidder who agreed not to dismiss any of the 7,000 workers.  The parent mining SOE, 
ZCCM,
17 had assessed that up to 3,000 of these workers would be redundant under any 
reasonable business plan, but had lacked the funds to make the required severance 
payments.  It therefore accepted a bid based on the dubious premise that the entire 
workforce could be maintained. Shortly following transfer of title, the new owner 
dismissed 3,000 workers.  Under Zambian law private owners are responsible for 
termination benefits of workers dismissed after sale; in this case the new owner has failed 
to make the required payments. Subsequently, the firm went out of business entirely, and 
the residual 4,000 workers are now in the same boat as the previously laid-off 3,000.  
Understandably, worker and public reaction has been severely critical.   
 
                                                 
15 Three of the closed firms had long been non-operational prior to sale.   
16 It is likely that there had been reductions in employee numbers prior to privatization, as part of reforms 
or in preparation for sale.  In many countries around the world, the largest layoffs come well before a 
change of ownership.  Thus, comparing employee numbers at the moment of privatization to some later 
point may underestimate the downsizing that occurred. 






Overall, it is clear that employment in the mining sector has decreased by at least 
7000 workers or 20 %.  Assuming that the dismissal rate in the other affected mines was 
equal to that in the non-mining sector (28.5 %), this would amount to an additional 7700 
layoffs, and a total reduction of workers in the privatized mining sector to around 
19,000—and the fate of 10,000 of the remainder is in doubt, given the decision by Anglo-
American, in January of 2002, to pull out of the ZCCM copper mining operations it had 
purchased in 1999. 
 
A digression is in order to sketch the sad story of copper in Zambia in the last 
decade. The highlights are: a persistent and precipitous fall in world copper prices,
18 a 
deep and costly politicization of the management and employment/procurement practices 
of the firm while an SOE; no investment in the sector for years prior to its sale; all this 
leading to Zambian production costs being among the highest in the world——resulting 
in losses on average of $15 million USD per month over the past five years of its 
existence as an SOE.  Discussions to privatize the sector began in 1991, but despite 
supposedly powerful donor prodding, nothing substantial was sold until 1999.
19  The first 
serious effort to sell came in 1996-97. A fairly firm $1 billion USD offer (counting 
promised investments) was on the table from a consortium of experienced copper firms. 
But responsibility for the transaction was removed from the respected Zambian 
Privatization Agency and handed over to a team of mine managers and former managers, 
many of whom had long opposed privatization. They rejected the offer and asked for 
much more, based on a book value calculation of the assets; the bidders walked away.  
Following two years of further asset deterioration and large losses the mines were sold 
for much less than what had been offered in 1997.  And no one seems to know if there 
were any cash proceeds from the eventual sales,
20 or what happened to them if they did 
exist. (African Business, 2000) 
                                                 
18 Copper traded at close to $7000 a ton in 1966 and averaged above $3000 a ton until the mid-1990s; 
current prices are between $1450 and $1600 a ton. 
19 The IFIs cannot win; they are blamed both for rushing the sale and delaying it.  When asked why the sale 
took so long a Zambian mining official said that it was the fault of the donors; their pressure on government 
to sell led bidders to “sit and wait until they feel the price is right.” (Africa Business, 2000, 2)   
20 It is conceivable that there were no proceeds from these transactions.  The costs of financial clean up and 







Perhaps the counterfactual would have been worse?  To repeat, the privatized 
firms, outside the severely depressed copper sector, have done quite well, almost 
certainly far better than they would have had they remained under government 
ownership——and this in a time of severe economic downturn in Zambia. In the mining 
sector, no one can defend the Luanshya/Baluba sale.  But even the low-price and 
subsequently cancelled take over of the other ZCCM mines by Anglo-American has 
resulted in substantial investments that government would never have been able to make.  
One can argue that perhaps these investments will serve as a foundation on which a 
subsequent owner can make the venture profitable (though clearly that was not the view 
of the highly experienced Anglo-American, which appears to have decided not to throw 
good money after bad). 
  
Overall, the argument that any reasonable counterfactual would have resulted in 
inferior outcomes is fairly persuasive in the case of small and medium firms producing 
tradable goods——but much less convincing when large, relatively valuable firms are at 
issue.  Certainly, the copper sector had been grossly mismanaged under state ownership, 
but it is evident that the privatization of the sector was poorly handled, both economically 
and socially. Zambians thus have legitimate reason to fear that the upcoming 
privatizations of major infrastructure firms could go wrong, given the non-transparent, 
efficiency and revenue decreasing manner that large firms have been divested in the past.  
An anti-privatization argument of despair once made in Russia may apply in the Zambian 
case:  Retaining firms in state hands means that any positive flow of resources generated 
will likely be largely siphoned off or wasted, depending on whether the managers and 
supervisors are venal or incompetent (or both).  But privatization may be worse, as the 
                                                                                                                                                 
revenues.  But in the absence of a proper accounting the public is given license to speculate that not only 
these transactions were corrupt, but all others as well.  (The IMF [2000] calculates, for 18 privatizing 
countries, that gross proceeds amount, on average, to 2% of GDP, while net proceeds [gross minus costs of 







lack of legal safeguards allows new owners to steal not simply the flow, but the entire 
stock of the firm.
21 
 
Finally, a nagging doubt:  Is this problem “institutional” or “political” in nature—
and what’s the difference?  In line with the emerging conventional wisdom, institution 
building did precede ownership change in Zambia, as evidenced by the high marks given 
the personnel, policies and procedures of the Zambian Privatization Agency, and the 
relative lack of contentious sales carried out by this body.   The major problem seems to 
have been the decision to remove the sales of the mining firms from the purview of the 
agency, a decision that was political in nature.  Some would argue that poor or corrupt 
political decisions are themselves “institutional shortcomings.” This maintains the 
conceptual unity of the institutional argument, but at the cost of enlarging yet again an 
already too vast and unwieldy subject.  And in practical terms, while one might make a 
case for retaining infrastructure firms in state hands pending the development of a 
modicum of regulatory capacity, the same can hardly be said for retention until the 
quality of sound political decision-making reaches some acceptable level. The point is to 
reiterate unease with the institution-building argument and approach. 
 
 Other  African  countries… 
Is the Zambian case typical? Regarding the crucial issue of transparency, Table 5 presents 
the type and incidence of privatization methods employed in Africa.  While no method is 
guaranteed to be free of manipulation and corruption, some methods are more transparent 
than others.  The sale of shares through a public floatation is generally thought to be 
about the most transparent sales approach; but it has rarely been applied in Africa 
(outside of Nigeria and South Africa) in part because of the thin or embryonic nature of 
capital markets in most countries.  Other methods can be designed to be competitive and 
transparent, such as tenders.  But the ultimate transparency of the tender method depends 
on the honesty and competence of its administrators, to a greater extent than stock 






the relevant firm (though it is likely that only large firms were sold through public 
floatation). 
Table 5:  Methods of Privatization (1991-2001) 
 
Method of divestiture  Number 
 Shares sold on Competitive Basis  728 
 Asset sold on a competitive basis  454 
 Liquidation  386 
 Shares sold to Existing Shareholders with Pre-emptive Rights  158 
 Lease  104 
 Direct sale of shares (i.e. non-competitive)  94 
 Shares sold trough public floatation  69 
 Not specified  48 
 Restitution to former owner  47 
 Management contract  42 
 Management/Employee Buyout  33 
 Direct sale of assets (i.e. non-competitive)  29 
 Joint-venture  28 
 Free transfer of assets  12 
 Transfer to Trustee  11 
 Debt-Equity Swap  10 
 Concession  8 
 JV(D)  5 
 Lease /Management contract  2 
 Merger  2 
TOTAL  2270 
 
 
Buchs (2002) estimates in Table 6 the countries where obviously less transparent 
methods have accounted for a significant minority of sales.  The numbers are sufficiently 
large to raise concerns, though no firm conclusions can be drawn. 
 
Table 6:   Countries in which uncompetitive methods reached 20% of total 
transactions (% of transactions) 
 
Country  Direct sale of assets  Direct sale of shares  Preemptive rights 
Cote d’Ivoire  8.5%  12%  11% 
Gambia   23%   
Ghana 5%  4%  9% 
Kenya 2%    51% 
Malawi   27%   
Sao Tome    25%   
                                                                                                                                                 
21 A similar argument was advanced in Kenya in January of 2000; several MPs and opinion-makers 
interviewed said they deplored the inefficiencies and rampant corruption in the major SOEs, but feared that 









Summarizing other studies of African privatizations:  Boubakri and Cosset (2002) 
looked at 16 privatizations on the continent of Africa (none in Zambia).  Profitability rose 
and efficiency fell, both by slight percentages. Neither of these shifts was statistically 
significant, but there was a significant increase in capital expenditures in the divested 
firms.
22   
 
Jones, Jammal and Gokgur (1998) analyzed 81 privatizations in Côte d’Ivoire, 
covering the electricity sector in infrastructure with the rest operating in competitive or 
potentially competitive markets (in agriculture, agro-industries, and services). They 
found: (i) Firms performed better after privatization; (ii) they performed better than they 
would have had they remained under public ownership; and (iii) privatization contributed 
positively to economic welfare, with annual net welfare benefits equivalent to about 25 
percent of pre-divestiture sales. These significant benefits stemmed from increases in 
output, investment, labor productivity, and intermediate-input productivity.   
 
Appiah-Kubi (2001) reviewed 212 privatizations in Ghana, and reported positive 
results, in terms of:  easing pressure on the balance of payments, increases in both 
allocative and x-efficiency, stimulation of local capital markets, enhancing the inflow of 
FDI, widespread quality gains for consumers, and increased employment and 
remuneration post-sale (though increases in jobs after privatization had not yet matched 
the cuts in worker numbers made prior to divestiture).  Andreasson (1998) assessed 
privatization’s impact in Mozambique and Tanzania and found positive changes in 
operating and financial performance of the divested firms.  In both countries many 
commercial state firms had ceased operation before divestiture was contemplated; in both 
countries, three-fourths of such firms returned to productive activity following 
privatization.   Substantial productivity gains were noted, due partly to reductions in the 
                                                 
22 The Boubakri/Cosset findings are of limited utility to this study since 10 of the 16 transactions analyzed 






workforce, but also because of improved utilization of capacity.  In most cases, 
investments, production, sales and value added increased sharply post-sale. “The over-
riding conclusion ….is that performance of privatized companies has met and even 
surpassed expectations.” (10) 
 
Temu and Due (1998 and 2000) also reviewed Tanzania’s privatization 
experience and examined in detail post-sale performance in a set of firms.  Of the 158 
firms divested through 1999, 136 (34 % of the pre-privatization universe of 395 SOEs) 
had been sold, 115 closed or liquidated; an additional 24 firms had been leased, 8 placed 
under management contracts, and the rest were yet to be divested.  By number, more than 
two-thirds of sales went to Tanzanian nationals; more than half of these “indigenous” or 
African buyers; the remainder, presumably, Tanzanian citizens of Asian descent.  South 
African firms (De Beers, South African Breweries, R. J. Reynolds Tobacco SA) featured 
prominently as purchasers of the larger value firms.  In their 1998 study, Temu and Due 
documented the extremely poor physical and financial condition of Tanzanian 
manufacturing firms prior to privatization,
23 and the tortuous, lengthy negotiations—
often lasting years—between potential buyers of even the most wasted assets and an 
endless line of officials; they termed it “privatization by exhaustion.”  They concluded 
that privatization “has increased government revenues, reduced subsidies to SOEs, and 
… forced firms to operate more efficiently.” (339) In their second study (2000) they 
noted employment levels in 16 privatized firms examined decreased by 48 %. (327) 
 
In infrastructure, Wallsten (1999) examined econometrically the effects of 
privatization, competition enhancement and regulation in telecommunications reform in 
30 countries, half of them in Africa, the rest in Latin America. Enhanced competition 
produces the clearest, most positive effects.  Ownership change by itself “does not appear 
to generate many benefits,” but does so when combined with separate and independent 
regulation.  These are summary conclusions, not disaggregated by region.  The data 
require careful interpretation:  “….the finding that privatization is negatively correlated 
                                                 
23 For example, the Morogoro Shoe Company, built—with IFI assistance—to produce 4 million shoes 






with the number of main lines….could arise because countries are more likely to 
privatize their incumbent telecom provider when service is poor….” (14) It may not be 
that privatization caused performance to weaken, as suggested by the regression, but 
rather that the weakest telecommunication firms were the ones to be privatized. 
 
More positively, Ménard and Clarke (2002, a) conclude that despite the evident 
problems of private provision of water in Guinea, “…all parties have benefited from 
reform…(as)….increased coverage and improved quality more than compensated 
consumers for higher prices.” (274)
24 A definitive judgment depends on what would have 
happened in the absence of private involvement: Ménard and Clarke argue that the 
situation would have been worse had water management remained in public hands.       
They reach even more upbeat conclusions concerning private provision of water in 
Abidjan, Ivory Coast (Ménard and Clarke, 2002, b), where 30 years of private activity 
has resulted in very high levels of coverage—despite rapid population growth—an 
excellent quality of water and service, and declining prices for all consumers.  Areas of 
concern are the decline of competitive bidding, the likelihood that the average price per 
m
3  could easily be even lower, and the fear that the flexible collaboration between 
government and private provider that lay at the heart of the Ivorian success in this venture 
will be destroyed by the political instability in the country since 1999.   
 
IV.  What is to be done? 
 
The first conclusion is that privatization of manufacturing, industrial and service 
sectors, and especially the small and medium firms in these sectors, should proceed 
apace. The empirical record on the effects of privatization in Africa is not as dense and 
robust as it is in other regions. Still, accumulating evidence suggests that firms producing 
tradables do more for the shareholders, consumers, taxpayers and economy in private 
hands they than ever did under public ownership. A surprising amount of assets of this 







Utilities and infrastructure, banks, railroads, and the large natural resource 
producers are the tougher cases. The dilemma is evident: Retaining them in classic SOE 
form means more poor service and financial losses; privatizing them incorrectly can be 
economically and politically problematic. Wallsten’s important conclusion
25 regarding 
telecommunications divestiture—ownership change per se does not produce efficiency 
gains, but ownership change combined with separate and independent regulation does—
must certainly apply to electricity and water and sewerage, given the lack in these sectors, 
compared to telecommunications, of technological change facilitating competition.   
 
Thus, the medium- to long-term solution is to create and reinforce the institutional 
mechanisms that guide and regulate sales and market operations.  Institutional 
improvements are required if African markets are to attract and retain good investors to 
manage, finance and own infrastructure services in ways that are beneficial to society 
while yielding a decent return on the capital and expertise expended. So, “institution 
building” programs——to enact the policy framework for and build implementation 
capacity in sales, regulatory and competition promotion agencies, to train the individual 
sellers and regulators, to empower and then isolate monitoring and enforcement agencies 
from political interference, to render contracts enforceable; all this would seem to be 
desirable.  There is already much underway in these fields in Africa, most of it supported 
by the donor community.  An examination of past initiatives to determine which were the 
more effective, why and under what circumstances, with suggestions on how to replicate 
the successful, might be of use. 
 
Should this be the main thrust of reform efforts is questionable?  Perhaps not.  
First, as the Guinea water case indicates, some infrastructure privatizations, in even the 
least auspicious institutional settings, have produced results far superior to the SOEs that 
preceded them.  It is unlikely that the benefits of holding off on the privatization until 
                                                                                                                                                 
24 Recent studies of privatization of infrastructure in Latin America also conclude that the benefits of 
increased access to these services post-sale outweigh the costs imposed on consumers by price increases. 
(McKenzie and Mookherjee, 2002) 






Guinean regulatory capacity was enhanced would outweigh the costs of poor SOE 
performance.  Second, the long record of poor accomplishments in the area of 
institutional reform cannot be ignored.  Nor can the ease with which substantive 
institutional achievements, such as the Zambian Privatization Agency, can be overturned 
or ignored at the drop of a political hat.    Over the last few decades donors and African 
governments have launched numerous institution-building, technical assistance, 
regulatory policy and capacity, and public sector management reform efforts, the positive 
and enduring results of which are hard to find.  They are not invisible, but they are 
certainly modest and often ephemeral.  On the reasoning that the impact of present and 
future institution building efforts will resemble those of the past, and noting that even in 
the rare instances where positive institutional change has been effected it has taken ages 
to produce, I conclude that interim and innovative measures are needed to advance 
private participation in infrastructure provision. 
 
Some possibilities: 
1.  Outsource institutional provision, for example by contracting regulatory 
conception and monitoring activities from skilled outsiders.  This was 
successfully carried out (prior to the escalation of violence) in the case of the 
Palestinian Water Authority in Gaza, in a situation of extraordinary institutional 
and political difficulty.   
 
In 1996, a private firm was awarded a four-year management contract to handle 
water and sanitation services.  Payment was in two parts: a set fee, and a bonus payment 
based on the achievement of stipulated performance targets. The provider agreed to 
submit periodic performance reports, on which the additional payment would be based.  
The Palestinian Authority lacked the capacity to monitor the contract and especially the 
performance reports of the private provider. 
 
The solution, funded by donors, was to hire Deloitte and Touche, Norway, to 
assess the technical and financial performance of the private provider.  Every six months 






confirmed or disputed the performance score.  By 1998 water service had improved 
considerably (consumption and revenues way up, system losses way down, water quality 
vastly improved). Outsourcing of regulation reportedly worked well; in its first report the 
private provider claimed a performance payment of $498,000 USD, but the D & T 
auditors disputed several results, and the amount was lowered to $444,000.  (Saghir, 
Sherwood and Macoun, 1999)   
 
2.  A variation on this theme is: Use private firms to carry out administrative 
functions that impede investment and privatization, and harm the general 
business environment.  For example, British Crown Agents have been contracted 
to handle procurement on a range of government contracts in a number of low-
income countries, including Bolivia and Mozambique.  This should speed the 




3.  Promote offshore commercial arbitration mechanisms; e.g.; several small 
island states in the Caribbean use British courts to arbitrate contractual disputes 
between governments and private providers. 
 
4.  Use respected NGOs, such as Transparency International, to vet transactions 
and certify the probity of the sales process, as has been done for example in a 
telecommunications license auction in Slovakia. 
 
5.  Use IFI guarantees to give comfort to investors regarding regulatory and 
contractual risk. For example, the World Bank offers investors partial risk 
guarantees insuring against sovereign, political and regulatory risks; e.g., state 
failure to meet payment obligations, disallowance of stipulated tariff hikes, 
expropriation, legal changes with adverse material effects on the investor, 






Ivory Coast and Uganda infrastructure privatizations have helped to mobilize 
financing and co-financing, lengthened maturities far beyond prevailing market 
terms, and significantly reduced interest spreads.  Since the guarantee backstops 
only the contractual agreements states make with investors, governments incur no 
additional contingent liabilities.
27  Fees for the guarantee are born by the 
investors. (Gupta et al., 2002) 
 
6.  To address the problem of small or deficient equity markets, the use of regional 
exchanges should be encouraged. 
 
Finally, the external private sector might assist by offering guidelines on 
transparent procedures on the part of investors in privatization transactions, or more 
simply, by subscribing to, endorsing and help promulgating the promising “Business 
Principles for Countering Bribery” initiative of Transparency International.
28   
 
Outsourcing and the reliance on such external measures could, indeed should 
produce positive effects.  But they will be politically sensitive or outrightly unacceptable 
to many in Africa, who are likely to regard them as further infringements of sovereignty, 
or further suggestions of African incompetence.  Even if accepted, these are at best 
temporary, stopgap measures.  The real answer lies in the internal evolution of the 
institutional and political frameworks, a process—to hammer home the point—that is not 
well understood but is, at the very least, time consuming.  Donors can cajole and help, as 
they have done in Guinea and Gaza and elsewhere, but their effectiveness is less than the 
                                                                                                                                                 
26 There are no panaceas:  A Swiss firm—SGS Holdings—contracted to handle some aspects of the 
corruption-ridden customs service in Pakistan is alleged to have bribed government officials in return for 
the contract, thus tainting the idea of outsourcing. 
27 There is a cost in that the amount available for lending from the World Bank (or IDA) to the country is 
reduced by the amount guaranteed.  That is, the sum guaranteed is nominally recorded as a World Bank 
loan.  The country pays no fee and makes no payments (unless the guarantee is called and the Bank has had 
to pay the investor).  
28 Launched in December 2002, with the assistance of a number of private firms including General Electric, 
Shell International and Rio Tinto, the principles “provide a framework for good business practices and risk 
management strategies for countering bribery.”  The summary document lists the areas where bribery and 
corruption are most prevalent in business operations—outright bribes, political contributions, charitable 
contributions and sponsorships, facilitation payments, gifts, hospitality and expenses—and states clearly 






eternally optimistic statements they issue would lead one to think.  The African 
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